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Symposium
It Came from Beneath the Twilight Zone:
Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism
Heidi Kitrosser
I.

Introduction

The past few decades have seen the rise of a deeply influential strain of
constitutional argument, sometimes called "presidential exclusivity." Exclusivists argue that the President has substantial discretion to override statutory
limits that he believes interfere with his ability to protect national security.'
To borrow terminology from Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,2 exclusivists deem any number of
"zone three" presidential actions defensible. On the spectrum of presidential
actions, zone three comprises those acts that contravene statutory mandates.3
"Zone one," in contrast, includes presidential actions that are statutorily
authorized.4 Presidential actions in "zone two," or the "zone of twilight,"
occur in the absence of legislation either authorizing or prohibiting them.5
Exclusivists deem the President's discretion to act in zone three
essential to his constitutional role. In this respect, some emphasize that

* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank Bobby Chesney for
inviting me to participate in the symposium for which I wrote this paper. I also thank the Texas
Law Review students and the symposium participants, especially my co-panelists, Jon Michaels,
John Radsan, and Steve Vladeck, and panel moderator Sandy Levinson for an outstanding event.
Finally, I am grateful to Larry Solum for very thoughtful comments.
1. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1027 (2008) [hereinafter Barron &
Lederman II] (invoking the term "presidential exclusivity" to describe this school of thought);
David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framingthe
Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,121 HARV. L. REv. 689, 694 (2008) [hereinafter
Barron & Lederman I] (describing exclusivist reasoning).
2. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 637.
4. Id. at 635.
5. Id. at 637.
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6
Article 1Iof the Constitution vests "[t]he executive Power" in the President.
Others stress the President's role as Commander in Chief of the military.7
Exclusivists argue that Founding Era understandings and logic dictate that
the President, to fulfill these constitutional roles, has significant discretion to
violate statutes as he deems necessary to protect national security. 8 Central
to this argument is the premise that the Executive and Commander in Chief
powers demand-and the founders structured the Presidency to ensure-the
capacity to act with "energy," meaning with "'decision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch . . . . 9 Statutes that restrict the President's ability to exercise this
capacity to protect national security raise serious constitutional questions, say
exclusivists.10
Exclusivists commonly buttress these arguments by citing American
history beyond the founding. For example, when presidential intelligencegathering operations have been challenged as exceeding statutory limits, exclusivists have defended them by citing to comparable programs throughout
American history.'" Non-exclusivists, or "balancers," typically respond to
such arguments by challenging the similarity of the historical examples to
current situations
or by noting that multiple illegalities do not cancel one an2

other out.1

6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,cl.1; see also, e.g., Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA
Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 375, 376, 381-84, 389-93 (2008) (presenting
the exclusivist component of his Vesting Clause argument tentatively, explaining that he offers only
"a few tentative words on the subject").
7. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 6-7, 29-35 (2006) [hereinafter DOJ
WHITEPAPER] (positing an exclusivist argument by reference to the Commander in Chief Clause);
JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 103, 114, 119-22 (2006) (describing justifications for wartime
exclusivity grounded partly in the Commander in Chief clause). Of course, the Commander in
Chief argument is not exclusive of the Vesting Clause argument. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 6, at
384 ("[A]lthough the [DOJ WHITEPAPER] does not articulate the Vesting Clause thesis with clarity,
it seems clear that the Vesting Clause thesis lurks beneath the argument and provides it with
substance."); Yoo, supra, at 103 (combining Vesting Clause and Commander in Chief arguments).
8. See, e.g., YOO, supra note 7, at 119-21 (citing Hamilton's views in the FederalistPapersto
support his argument that the President's discretion to use military powers in national emergencies
must not be limited by Congress).
9. Minority Report, in REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITrEES INVESTIGATING THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No, 100-433, S. REP. NO. 100-216, at 460 (1987) [hereinafter
Minority Report] (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
10. See, e.g., id. (citing Federalist No. 70 to argue that the Constitution gives the Presidentwho is "more energetic" and more politically accountable--control over national security and
foreign policy); Yoo, supra note 7, at 120-21 (citing Federalist No. 70 to argue that the presidential
power to protect the nation "ought to exist without limitation").
11. See, e.g., DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 6-8 (chronicling uses of warrantless searches
and surveillance under Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Johnson).
12. See, e.g., Letter from Curtis A. Bradley et al., to Members of Congress 5-6 (Feb. 2, 2006)
[hereinafter Law Professors Letter] (arguing that the long wiretapping history cited by the Bush
Administration is irrelevant to current debates because that history predated statutory regulation of
wiretapping).
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Some commentators chide exclusivists and balancers alike for citing
evolving history. For example, Professor Paulsen observes:
Under one school of thought, ours is a "living Constitution," the
meaning of which changes with the times. Under another, the
Constitution sets forth immutable principles of fundamental law that
must never be altered by mere government officials. The "Living
Constitution" position is usually associated with "liberal"
constitutional theorists, and the "Original Meaning" position with
"conservatives." But in the area of war powers, the positions of the
contending parties seem almost exactly reversed. "Conservatives"
frequently defend broad presidential war-initiating power, against the
greater weight of evidence of original meaning and design. More
shockingly yet, they do so largely for policy reasons and defend such
antioriginalist constitutional revisionism on the basis of consistent
modem practice-a position that few conservative constitutional
scholars would defend in other areas (like criminal procedure,
abortion, or expansive conceptions of federal government power). But
so too do "liberals" change their constitutional stripes when it comes
to war: In few, if any, areas do those who otherwise so fervently
defend the idea of an evolving, changing Constitution cling so
tenaciously to the Framers and the original meaning of the words of
the Constitution! 13
Yet unless one rejects the notion that post-founding history can ever
shed light on constitutional law, the question is not whether post-founding
history categorically is or is not relevant. Rather, the question is case
specific: whether-given the constitutional provisions at issue, the postfounding history cited, and the interpretive proposition for which that history
is offered-the history indeed furthers the proposition. If one reads the relevant provisions of Articles I and II as sufficiently vague to leave room for
bounded shifts in application,1 4 then it is important to examine exclusivist
uses of evolving history on their own terms. Only then can one determine if
evolving historical practice remains within acceptable bounds of constitutional construction and what further light, if any, practice sheds on such
construction.1 5 Furthermore, as a practical matter, the increasing influence of

13. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The War Power, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 120 (2010).
14. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 69 (11. Coll. of Law, Working Paper No.
07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-l120244 (positing that "constitutional
construction operates after interpretation yields semantic content that is vague, ambiguous, or

contains gaps or contradictions").
15. See id. at 59 (explaining that "individual words and phrases that comprise the constitution
could have different meanings if they were uttered in different contexts"); cf Jack M. Balkin,
Original Meaning and ConstitutionalRedemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 433 (2007) ("If the
original meaning of the text requires 'equal protection,' then we enforce equal protection today
How we apply the principles of equal protection,
because the text continues to require it ....

however, may well be different from what people expected in 1868 based in part on our
contemporary understandings.").
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exclusivity in the political branches and courts alike provides an important
independent reason to address major exclusivist arguments, including those
from evolving history.
This Article considers exclusivist arguments from evolving history. It
finds that such arguments reflect a fundamental error that runs throughout
exclusivist analyses. That is, exclusivists conflate the President's structural
capacities-in particular, his "energy," 16 -with a legal prerogative to utilize
those capacities as he sees fit, even to circumvent statutory constraints, to
protect the nation. Elsewhere, I have discussed this error as a matter of text,
structure, and Founding Era history. Using these tools, I explain that the
President's capacities are constitutionally subject to statutory restraint outside of extraordinary and temporally limited cases, such as where Congress is7
physically unable to amend legislation in time to confront an emergency.
In this Article, I examine this exclusivist error through the use of evolving
American history.
This Article focuses predominantly on examples involving wiretapping
from the administration of FDR through the present. It identifies two major
respects in which exclusivist arguments from evolving history err by conflating capacity with legal prerogative. First, exclusivists deem past
instances of presidential initiative or legislative acquiescence (with the latter
demonstrated either through silence or through failure to react meaningfully
where the President circumvents statutory limits) to arise naturally from the
President's and Congress's respective capacities and therefore to reflect the
proper constitutional order. 18 Hence, to defend a years-long warrantless
wiretapping program during the Bush Administration (the Terrorist
Surveillance Program, or TSP) that many concluded violated the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 19 the Administration argued that many
past presidents had engaged in wiretapping on their own initiative. 20 At least
one Administration supporter argued that FDR had done so in the face of a
prohibiting statute. 2' Yet this history supports the TSP only if one assumes
that a capacity to initiate and undertake a warrantless wiretapping program is
the same as a legal prerogative to do so in the face of a contrary statute. If
the two are not the same, then the fact that prior administrations have har-

16. Minority Report, supra note 9, at 460.
17. I have made this point extensively in the context of the President's capacity to keep secrets.
See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, ClassifiedInformation Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 881,
896-926. I also make this point with respect to the President's capacities more generally in Heidi
Kitrosser,

"Macro-Transparency" as Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA

Surveillance

Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163, 1167-73 (2007).
18. See infra subpart II(A).
19. See John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO. MASON

L. REV. 565, 565 (2007) (noting that both academic and political critics claim that TSP violates
FISA).
20. DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 7-8, 16-17.

21. YOO, supra note 7, at 114-15.
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nessed their capacities to take such initiative, possibly in the face of contrary
legislation, hardly proves that such actions are legal prerogatives of the
President. If one's premise is that constitutional text, structure, and history
dictate that presidential capacities are dangerous and thus to be restrained
through legislation, such past instances are better read as cautionary prods to
the people and the Congress-reminders of James Madison's warning that
the Constitution's "parchment barriers" are meaningless if not actively
guarded.22
Second, another thread in the exclusivist narrative about post-founding
history-that past instances of presidential initiative and congressional
acquiescence reflect longstanding acknowledgment by each branch of the
23
President's exclusive role in much of foreign affairs and national security is infused with the assumption that acts or omissions reflecting the branches'
respective capacities, including the relative ease of unilateral action on the
President's part and the difficulty of enacting legislation, also reflect their
respective legal prerogatives. This assumption is belied by substantial evidence to the contrary. In the case of wiretapping, for example, while
members of the FDR through Kennedy Administrations acknowledged that
they wiretapped and at times lobbied Congress for legislation "clarifying"
their authority to do so, 24 there is a near absence (with one exception discussed below) in the extensive legislative hearings on wiretapping and in
administration statements of anything resembling an exclusivist argument. 25
To the contrary, these discussions and statements overwhelmingly assume
has the legal power to prothat Congress, even in the midst of a World War,
26
wiretapping.
security
national
restrict
or
hibit
The Article also observes exclusivity's rise over the past several
decades. Exclusivity reared its head to a limited degree in congressional
hearings preceding FISA's passage in the mid-to-late 1970s. 27 By the early
twenty-first century, exclusivist arguments were a substantial presence in
hearings preceding the 2008 FISA Amendments Act.28 This trajectory reflects the rising influence of exclusivist thought in modem political debate.
Exclusivists have themselves become part of the story of the imperial
presidency. As their arguments have increasingly entered the mainstream,
they have helped to translate the President's structural capacities into legal
prerogatives. Indeed, exclusivity has increasingly gained a presence in public debate as well as in the halls of Congress and the courts. Furthermore, by
exclusivity's own logic, these developments have an ongoing ratcheting

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See infra subpart II(B).
See infra notes 74-76, 137-41 and accompanying text.
See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
See infra subpart Ill(B).
See infra subpart W(A).
See infra subpart IV(B).
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effect. From an exclusivist perspective, the more that Congress and the
President evince
respect for exclusivity, the more constitutionally imperative
29
it becomes.
Part II explains that presidential exclusivity conflates the President's
structural capacities with legal prerogatives. This error manifests itself in
exclusivist uses of evolving history generally and with respect to wiretapping
in particular. Part III examines political-branch developments concerning
wiretapping from the FDR through Johnson Administrations. The events
demonstrate the President's formidable structural capacities to act despite
congressional and public disapproval. The notion that these events bolster
exclusivity makes sense only if one assumes that strong presidential capacities must reflect strong legal prerogatives. Instead, the events confirm the
wisdom of ringing the President's capacities with statutory limits and interbranch oversight. Part III also demonstrates the near absence of exclusivity
from the political-branch debates over wiretapping during this time. Part IV
explains that wiretapping-related exclusivity arguments have begun to gain
acceptance and momentum in the political branches over the past few
decades. Exclusivists thus have themselves become part of the evolving
history that they cite on behalf of their views.
II.

Presidential Exclusivity and the TSP

As is now well known, the Bush Administration operated the TSP in
secret from shortly after September 11, 2001 until the New York Times
publicly revealed the program in December 2005. 30 Under the TSP, the
Administration authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to wiretap
certain calls between the United States and abroad without warrants, despite
FISA's prohibition on warrantless wiretapping of calls between the United
States and other nations. 31 As such, TSP critics said that the program took
place in zone three and that there was no emergency or other rationale that
could constitutionally justify a years-long, secretive statutory violation.32
TSP defenders disputed that it took place in zone three at all. They maintain
that FISA was implicitly amended by the joint congressional resolution that
authorized the President to use force in the wake of 9/ 11.33 In the alternative,
they make the presidential exclusivity argument that, if FISA did preclude

29. See infra subparts II, IV(B).
30. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
31. Id.; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE DEP'T OF DEFENSE ET AL., REPORT NO. 20090113-AS, (U) UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 1 (2009)

[hereinafter DOD REPORT], availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf.
32. See, e.g., Law Professors Letter, supra note 12, at 2-9 (explaining that the TSP violates
FISA and that the Commander in Chief Clause does not authorize the violation).
33. See DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 7, at 2-3 (deeming the AUMF statutory wiretapping
authorization as contemplated by FISA).
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the TSP, FISA was unconstitutional as so applied.34 As such, the TSP was
legal even if it occurred in zone three.35 At minimum, TSP defenders argue
that their statutory interpretation should prevail to avoid the constitutional
problem that would exist, from an exclusivity perspective, under a different
reading.36
To support their constitutional position, TSP defenders explain that
presidents have authorized domestic and international wiretapping for national security purposes "at least since the administration of Franklin
Roosevelt in 1940." 37 TSP opponents rejoin that this history is not on point,
as the cited events took place prior to FISA and hence in zone two. 38 Yet at
least one TSP defender argues that Section 605 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1934, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in two cases decided in
193739 and 1939,40 prohibited wiretapping. 41 Wiretapping engaged in while
that version of the Act controlled thus is precedent, he argues, for wiretapping contrary to FISA.42 Two other commentators, in a coauthored piece,
similarly say that the FDR Administration wiretapped in violation of the
strong-though ultiTelecommunications Act, establishing "surprisingly"
43
TSP.
the
for
insufficient-precedent
mately
If evolving history is neither categorically irrelevant to nor
determinative of presidential-power issues, then the question is why a history
of presidential initiative in the face of statutory restraints or congressional
silence bears on the TSP's legality if the TSP occurred in zone three. TSP
defenders, and exclusivists generally, do not always spell out the implications of the evolving history that they cite. Yet we can glean, as a matter of
logic, two major arguments as to why evolving history might support
exclusivity. Furthermore, as I explain in the next section, exclusivists
sometimes invoke these arguments explicitly.

34. Id. at 35.
35. Id. at 3, 35.
36. Id. at 3, 28-35.

37. Id. at 7; see also id. at 7-8, 16-17 (recounting practices of Roosevelt and subsequent
presidents authorizing both wartime and peacetime wiretapping); YOO, supra note 7, at 114-15
(contending that, until the enactment of FISA, presidents since FDR had authorized peacetime
domestic wiretapping); Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the
Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1023, 1025

(2008) (describing the Bush Administration's defense of TSP through historical precedents).
38. See Law Professor Letter, supra note 12, at 5-6 (deeming the precedents cited by the Bush
Administration irrelevant because they predated FISA); see also Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at
1025-27 (recounting the view of TSP opponents that the historical precedent cited by the Bush
Administration does not support the Administration's actions).
39. Nardone v. United States (Nardone 1), 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
40. Nardone v. United States (Nardone I1), 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
41. See Yoo, supra note 19, at 588 & n.164 (stating that FDR ordered surveillance even though
the Supreme Court decision of Nardone I interpreted section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 to prohibit electronic surveillance).
42. Yoo, supra note 7, at 114-15.
43. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at 1024, 1027-29.
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A. History as Reflecting ConstitutionalCapacities,Hence Prerogatives
The first exclusivist argument from evolving history was invoked
explicitly by Professor Yoo, who drafted memoranda justifying the TSP's
legality while in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel. 4 In a
book chapter justifying the TSP's legality published after he left the Justice
Department, Yoo argues that the Constitution grants the President control
over intelligence policy "because the office's structure allows it to act with
unity, secrecy, and speed. 4 5 He also cites "[d]ecades of American constitutional practice" whereby, among other things, "[p]residents have long
ordered electronic surveillance without any judicial or congressional
participation" and whereby "FDR ordered . . . surveillance even though 4a6
Supreme Court decision and a federal statute at the time prohibited" it.
Proceeding from founding intent to constitutional structure to evolving
history, he explains that the President has been able to take such actions over
time-that is, to "[gain] the leading role in war and national security" because of his office's capacities and hence its "superior ability to take the
initiative in response to emergencies. 47
The same logic was voiced in a classic exposition of exclusivity in the
Minority Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the IranContra Affair in 1987. The Minority Report was joined by Senators James
McClure and Orrin Hatch and by Representatives Dick Cheney, William S.
Broomfield, Henry J. Hyde, Jim Courter, Bill McCollum, and Michael
DeWine. 48 Years later, as Vice President under George W. Bush and a key
supporter of the TSP, Dick Cheney would point to the Minority Reportwritten partly by David Addington, then a committee staff member and later
chief of staff to Vice President Cheney and an architect of the TSp 49 -- as embodying his views on presidential power. 50 The Minority Report argues that
some of the statutory directives that President Reagan and his subordinates
were said to have violated in the Iran-Contra affairs were unconstitutional

44. DOD REPORT, supra note 31, at 11. For some background on Professor Yoo's involvement
with the TSP, see, for example, id. at 10-14.
45. YOO, supra note 7, at 114.
46. Id. at 121, 114-15.
47. Id. at 119.
48. Minority Report, supra note 9, at 431.
49. See Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power: A Secret Architect of the War on Terror, NEW
YORKER, July 3, 2006, at 44, 49 (stating that Addington "contributed legal research" to the Minority
Report); Chitra Ragavan, Cheney's Guy, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, May 29, 2006, at 32, 35
(noting that Addington "helped write" the Minority Report).
50. FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & AzIz Z. HuQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED:

PRESIDENTIAL POWER INA TIME OF TERROR 154-55, 159-60, 200 (2008) (quoting Vice President
Dick Cheney, Remarks to the Traveling Press (Dec. 20, 2005), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051220-9.html).
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5
infringements that the President was free to ignore. " The Minority Report
cites the founding premises that the President will be capable of "'decision,
activity, secrecy, and dispatch"' and that he will be readily accountable for
his actions. 52 From this, the Minority Report draws a constitutional presumption that activities that call for such capacities or that involve case-by-case
decision making for which a single person can most readily be held to account belong to the President alone.53 Among the activities in this category
are "the deployment and use of force (but not declarations of war), together
with negotiations, intelligence gathering, and other diplomatic communications (but not treaty ratification). 54
The Minority Report argues that this founding design has been borne
55
The Minority
out by actions of the political branches throughout history.
without
action
Report cites instances in which the President took unilateral
seeking congressional approval, including covert operations, intelligence
gathering, uses of force, and actions taken pursuant to the President's interpretation of treaties.56 The report deems it unsurprising that presidents have
frequently asserted rights to act without congressional sanction. It quotes
Gary Schmitt's observation to the effect that such assertions follow naturally
from the President's structural capacities:
To some extent, the enumerated powers found in Article II are
deceiving in that they appear understated. By themselves, they do not
explain the particular primacy the presidency has had in the
governmental system since 1789. What helps to explain this fact is
the presidency's radically different institutional characteristics,
especially its unity of office. Because of its unique features, it
enjoys-as the framers largely intended-the capacity of acting with
the greatest expedition, secrecy and effective knowledge. As a result,
affairs, are
when certain stresses, particularly in the area of foreign 57
forefront.
the
to
rise
"naturally"
will
it
placed on the nation,

B. History as Reflecting Acknowledgment of ConstitutionalPrerogatives
Another implicit and sometimes explicit exclusivist argument is that a
history of presidential initiative and congressional acquiescence reflects acknowledgment of presidential exclusivity by both branches. In his book
chapter supporting the TSP, for example, John Yoo characterizes "[d]ecades

51. See Minority Report, supra note 9, at 450-51 (arguing, for example, that the Boland
Amendment was "clearly unconstitutional" to the extent that it prohibited the President or his agents

from engaging in diplomatic communications with whatever countries he wished).
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 460 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 463-69.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 465-66 (quoting Gary J. Schmitt, Jefferson and Executive Power: Revisionism and
the "Revolution of 1800", 17 PUBLIUS 7, 23 n.29 (1987)).
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of American constitutional practice" as "reject[ing] the notion of an omnipotent Congress., 58 He goes so far as to characterize TSP opponents, who
deemed it impermissible for the President to violate FISA in secret for several years after 9/11, as "want[ing] to overturn American historical practice
in favor of a new and untested theory about the wartime powers of the
President and Congress. 5 9
This argument fits within a more general exclusivist narrative. The
narrative posits that Congress, for the bulk of American history, respected
presidential exclusivity and thus passed few statutory constraints in the
realms of foreign affairs or national security. It was only in the twentieth
century, for a period between the two World Wars and then again-with a
vengeance-from the 1970s through today, that Congress broke this
pattern. 60 From this perspective, we are today left with a "fettered
Presidency" that stands in sorry contrast to the constitutional plan that
Congress acknowledged and respected for nearly two centuries. 6 1 Many of
the essays in a 1989 book titled The Fettered Presidency, published by the
American Enterprise Institute, make this point.62 One essay in the collection
argues that early congresses "[appear] to have understood [their] power to
'make all laws.., necessary and proper for carrying into execution ...all
other powers' as mandating that [they] 'facilitate the exercise of executive
power in the realm of foreign affairs.',, 63 In contrast, the essay's authors use
the example of congressional oversight of covert action to lament that more
64
recent congresses have overstepped their traditional and constitutional role.
The Minority Report is rife with similar sentiments. Referring to the use of
force without congressional authorization, for example, the report concludes
that, "[u]ntil recently, the Congress did not even question the President's
58. YOO, supra note 7, at 121.
59. Id. at 124-25.
60. See, e.g., Gary J. Schmitt & Abram N. Shulsky, The Theory and Practiceof Separation of
Powers: The Case of Covert Action (explaining that congressional oversight was generally very
deferential to the President until the mid-1970s), in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL
CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 59, 61-65 (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin
eds., 1989); Abraham D. Sofaer, Separation of Powers and the Use of Force (deeming the War
Powers Resolution a shift from "the historic pattern of separation of powers"), in THE FETTERED
PRESIDENCY, supra, at 18-20; John G. Tower, Congress Versus the President: The Formulation
and Implementation of American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229, 229-30, 234, 242-43
(1981) (observing that after World War II, Congress generally deferred to the President's judgment
on national security and foreign policy but that Congress became more aggressive in the 1970s); cf
Barron & Lederman II, supra note 1, at 947 (criticizing this narrative, or "legislative abdication
paradigm," as "severely overdrawn insofar as it purports to describe longstanding practice").
61. See, e.g., Schmitt & Shulsky, supra note 60, at 61-65 (arguing that while recent Congresses
have adopted an aggressive oversight posture, Congress historically understood its constitutional
role as subordinate to the President in national security matters, and this traditional understanding
was consistent with founding views); Sofaer, supra note 60, at 20 (deeming the War Powers
Resolution to threaten the "planned separation of powers" of the Constitution's founders).
62. THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, supranote 60.
63. Schmitt & Shulsky, supra note 60, at 62.

64. Id. at 62-65, 71-75.
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authority. 65 It also observes that, "[flor the Congresses that had accepted
the overt presidential uses of military force summarized [elsewhere in the
report], the use of Executive power for... covert activities raised no constitutional questions. 66 The Minority Report explicitly links these examples to
the case for presidential exclusivity, concluding that:
[c]ongressional actions to limit the President in [the area of
foreign policy] should be reviewed with a considerable degree of
skepticism. If they interfere with core presidential foreign policy
functions, they should be struck down. Moreover, the lesson of
our constitutional history67is that doubtful cases should be decided
in favor of the President.
III. Lessons from the FDR Through Johnson Administrations
In the context of the TSP, then, exclusivists seem to rely on exclusivity
to make three main points, whether explicitly or by implication. First, as a
descriptive matter, they characterize the period from FDR until FISA's passage as one in which presidents freely wiretapped without congressional
sanction and possibly in the face of a contrary statute. Second, they suggest
that this pattern of presidential initiative and congressional acquiescence reflects the respective constitutional capacities of the two branches. From this,
they infer a constitutional prerogative on the President's part to act in the
face of a statutory prohibition. Third, they suggest that Congress's long history of acquiescence reflects its acknowledgment that it lacks much
constitutional power to restrict intelligence gathering.
This Part argues that the history does not support exclusivity but rather
demonstrates its fatal flaw-its reliance on conflating capacity with legal
prerogative. Subpart A explains that the history confirms the relatively great
structural capacities of the Presidential office, an advantage compounded by
the growth of both technology and government. This structural advantage
does not amount to or support a right to ignore legal restraints on the same.
To the contrary, evidence of this advantage confirms the wisdom of subjecting presidential capacities to statutory restrictions. Subpart B explains that
Congress's failure to pass legislation in this period to establish or "clarify"
restraints on wiretapping reflects the arduousness of the legislative process
relative to the President's capacities for unilateral action. The failure does
not reveal a historical consensus that Congress may not legally restrict intelligence gathering. To the contrary, the debates of the time suggest a widely
held assumption that it is for Congress to decide (in tandem with the
President's veto power) whether to limit intelligence gathering.

65. Minority Report, supra note 9, at 467.
66. Id. at 469.
67. Id.
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A. The Wisdom of Containingthe President'sCapacities
1. The President as Default Policymaker.-As noted earlier, some
observers characterize wiretapping during the FDR Administration as taking
place in zone three.68
Specifically, they cite Section 605 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1934, which provided that "no person receiving
...any interstate or foreign communication by wire.., shall divulge or
publish the [same] .

. .

, except through authorized channels of transmission

or reception., 69 They also cite two Supreme Court cases from 1937 and 1939
(the "Nardone cases," so called after a defendant in the underlying criminal
cases), which they characterize as interpreting Section 605 to prohibit all
wiretapping by federal officers. 70 The Nardone cases held that statements
tapped on a wire (Nardone 1)and the fruits of such statements (Nardone I1)
must be excluded as evidence in federal courts.7 1
Yet as one set of these commentators observes, FDR and his Justice
Department vigorously disputed that Section 605, on its own or through the
Nardone cases, had this effect. They maintained that Section 605 prohibited
only wiretapping and "divulg[ing]" its fruits in an evidentiary or similar
context.7 Attorney General Jackson explained in a 1941 letter to Congress
that he had suspended wiretapping for a short period in 1940 because the
Nardone evidentiary restrictions limited its usefulness. He made clear,
however, the Justice Department's position that wiretapping is legal:
There is no federal statute that prohibits or punishes wire tapping
alone ....
...It is [the divulging of evidence obtained by wiretapping in open
court] that court decisions hold to violate the statute .... [S]ince our

use of [wiretapping] would have as its chief purpose the proof of a
case against criminals, the practical effect of these decisions is to
make wire tapping unavailing to law-enforcement officers 73....For
this reason it was discontinued by the Department of Justice.

68. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
69. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2006).
70. See YOO, supra note 7, at 114-15 (citing these authorities to argue that FDR wiretapped in
zone three); Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at 1041-52 (citing these authorities to argue that FDR
wiretapped in zone three).
71. Nardone v. United States (Nardone 1), 302 U.S. 379, 380-82 (1937); Nardone v. United
States (Nardone 11), 308 U.S. 338, 339-41 (1939).
72. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at 1049-52.
73. To Authorize Wiretapping: Hearing on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 18-19 (1941) [hereinafter To Authorize WiretappingHearing] (statement
of Robert H. Jackson, Att'y Gen. of the United States); see also Herbert Brownell, Jr., The Public
Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 199 (1954) (explaining that Jackson's
suspension was short-lived-FDR ordered that wiretapping resume later that year).
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This position was maintained in subsequent administrations.74 Herbert
Brownell, President Eisenhower's first Attorney General, stated in a 1954
Cornell Law Quarterly article that "except for a short period during 1940,
every Attorney General over the last twenty-two years has favored and authorized wiretapping by federal officers ....Moreover, this policy adhered
to by my predecessors has been taken with the full knowledge, consent and
approval of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. 7 5 In 1962 Attorney General
Robert Kennedy told Congress that, under Section 605, it was legal to
wiretap, but not to divulge the acquired information as evidence. He
observed that all administrations since FDR's have engaged in limited wiretapping and that "Congress has been advised [as such] each year by the
Director of the [FBI]. '76
Despite these confident public pronouncements, there was widespread
dispute within and outside of the Executive Branch about wiretapping's legality under Section 605. Attorney General Jackson later acknowledged that
he had temporarily suspended wiretapping because he thought it was
illegal.77 And many within Congress, the press, and the public reacted with
dismay to the fact of FBI wiretapping throughout these years, insisting that it
was against the law. 78 A 1940 resolution of the Senate Interstate Commerce
Committee deemed wiretapping illegal in light of Section 605 and the
Nardone cases, but lamented that it is "not likely to be eschewed by lawenforcement agencies. 79 It added that wiretapping is "especially dangerous
at the present time, because of the recent resurgence of a spy system conducted by Government police." 80 Twelve years later, a Columbia Law
Review article observed that, "despite the statutes and judicial decisions
which purport to regulate wire tapping, today this practice flourishes as a
wide-open operation at the federal, state, municipal, and private levels." 81

74. In fact, this position was maintained by the Justice Department until 1965.

CONGR.

RESEARCH SERV., THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT: BACKGROUND AND
SUMMARY OF ITS PROVISIONS 17 (1968); SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS., SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING: SUMMARY-REPORT OF

HEARINGS 1958-1961,5-6, 15-16, 18-19 (1962).
75. Brownell, supra note 73, at 200.
76. Wiretapping-The Attorney General's Program-1962:Hearing on S. 2813 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 11 (1962) [hereinafter 1962 WiretappingHearing] (statement
of Robert Kennedy, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
77. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

68-69 (2003); see also Brownell, supra note 73, at 199 (suggesting that Jackson issued the
suspension order because he thought wiretapping illegal); To Authorize WiretappingHearing,supra
note 73, at 221-22 (citing a New York Times article describing Jackson's actions after NardoneI1).
78. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at 1047 ("By this point, hostility towards wiretapping had
been expressed by Congress, affirmed by the Court, and applauded by the media.").
79. S.REP. No.76-1304, at4-5 (1940).

80. Id.
81. Alan F. Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 165, 167 (1952); see also id. at 168-69 (alerting the reader to the prevalence of
wiretapping by private actors and blaming it on the government's poor example).
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The article reported "[t]he general mood of the press ...[as] one of dissatisfaction with the prevalence of unlimited wire tapping. 8 2
Consider what it says about the Presidency's structural advantages that,
despite the acknowledged existence and hotly contested legality of administration policies permitting FBI wiretapping, the policies persisted for
decades.83 This history reflects the natural capacity of the President and his
subordinates to prevail by default, simply by continuing to take a disputed
course of action. 84 As government's "doer" branch, the Executive has unique
access to its human and technological resources. 85 Unlike Congress, which
can draft legislation but lacks the tools to implement it, and the Judiciary,
which announces but lacks the means to execute legal rulings, the86 President's
constitutional tools uniquely equip him for self-propelled action.
Presidential wins by default in the wiretapping realm also reflect how
the President's intrinsic capacity advantages are compounded by the growth
of government infrastructure since the nation's founding. Prior to "World
War 1I and the preparations for it in the late 1930s," communications
surveillance-while engaged in, and sometimes heavily so by the federal87
government-was not entrenched in permanent government infrastructure.
Rather:
The first century and a half of American democracy was marked
by intermittent episodes of internal intelligence gathering. Monitoring
dissent, by the federal government at least, was undertaken only in
response to a crisis of the moment; with the passing of the crisis, the
monitoring ceased, and the federal machinery
that supported it was
88
dismantled or retooled for other tasks.
In this period, government called upon a hodgepodge of resources for help in
intelligence gathering, including private detective agencies, citizens' groups,

82. Id.at 189.
83. See Brownell, supra note 73, at 197-200 (chronicling the debate on legality and the

continued use of the policy through the years).
84. See Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today's
Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop PresidentialInitiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395,

399 (2009) (explaining that, given their "power to execute ...Presidents often win by default");
Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory, 29

PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 855-56 (1999) (describing President's unique structural capacity to
"shift the status quo by taking unilateral action"); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why
PresidentialPower Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 518 (2008) (citing
the President's first-mover advantage); Mark Tushnet, ControllingExecutive Power in the War on

Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2677 (2005) (citing the President's first-mover advantage).
85. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 84, at 511-17 (citing examples of the President's
advantageous access to government resources).
86. Moe & Howell, supra note 84, at 860-62, 866-70 (describing the weaknesses of Congress
and the Judiciary relative to the President).
87. RICHARD E. MORGAN, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA 15-

16, 36 (1980).
88. Id. at 16.
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and personnel from throughout the Executive Branch.89 Yet "[w]ith World
War II, which marked in so many ways the modernization of the American
national government, this distinctly premodern pattern of intermittent publicprivate efforts was broken, and a permanent, specialized domestic intelligence capacity was institutionalized at the federal level." 90
The growth of an intelligence infrastructure equips the Executive
Branch with a permanent arsenal of powerful tools. 91 The arsenal adds substance to the structural advantages intrinsic in the President's "doer" role. 92
Absent a permanent and continuously funded infrastructure, intelligence
gathering is obviously more difficult to achieve without explicit congressional sanction and funding.93 The difficulty is all the greater in the face of
an explicit congressional prohibition, making it harder, for example, for the
President to allocate funds based on vaguely worded appropriations.9 4 Yet,
like the effective creation of a large standing army, the creation of a vast and
permanent intelligence infrastructure adds substance to the President's theoretical capacity to go it alone.95
As noted, exclusivists infer from the President's physical capacity to
"go it alone" by wiretapping in zone two or zone three that he has a legal prerogative to do so. 9 6 Yet the latter need not follow from the former. To the
89. Id. at 22-26. An important caveat to this observation is that institutionalized intelligence
apparatus arose in the military during the Civil War and in the FBI's predecessor, the Bureau of
Intelligence (BOI) during the infamous Palmer Raid period after World War I. While these events
were important precursors to the modem intelligence bureaucracy, they were also products of their
times insofar as the infrastructure in each case was at least partly dismantled for a period-in the
case of the Civil War because the war ended, in the case of the Palmer Raids because of the disgrace
that they brought to the BOI. Id. at 19-21, 27-30; David Williams, The Bureau of Investigation and
its Critics 1919-1921: The Origins of FederalPoliticalSurveillance, 68 J. AM. HIST. 560, 560-61,
579 (1981). The post-Palmer Raids period is particularly interesting as it seems to mark a gray area
between the worlds of interim and permanent intelligence infrastructure-while the BOI formally
shut down surveillance operations not directly related to criminal investigations, between 1924 and
1936 it "hired paid informers to collect information on the activities of liberal and radical political
and labor organizations." Id. at 560, 578.
90. MORGAN, supra note 87, at 16; see also GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN
PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 57, 59-61, 82-83, 98 (explaining that a
permanent "national security state" arose after World War II, including a permanent surveillance
infrastructure).
91. See Marshall, supra note 84, at 515-17 (noting that the power of the Executive Branch is
heightened by its control of intelligence gathering and other technological and human resources).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., WILLS, supra note 90, at 99-102 (explaining that the Constitution seeks to check
Executive Branch power through Congress's control over funding and that aspects of the national
security state enable the Executive Branch to circumvent this check).
94. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 52-53 (1990)
(recounting congressional efforts to curtail military activities through explicit funding restrictions).
95. See supra notes 91-92; see also, e.g., KOH, supra note 94, at 52-53 (detailing examples of
military activities that continued to be funded and supported by the Executive Branch despite
congressional prohibitions on such funding and support).
96. See infra subpart II(A) (explaining that exclusivists often infer from the President's
demonstrated structural capacity to act without or against statutory authority that he has a legal right
to so act).
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contrary, the wiretapping history discussed above could be invoked to demonstrate the logic of a constitutional design that accords the President strong
capacities but deems their uses legally legitimate only when authorized by
Congress (in zone one) or at minimum not prohibited by Congress (not in
zone three). As history demonstrates, the absence of legal legitimacy alone
is not enough to stop a determined administration.97 Yet there are logical and
historical bases to believe that the stamp of legal illegitimacy has political
and practical deterrent effects. 98
That potential deterrent weakens
considerably where presidents manage not only to engage in self-initiated,
even statute-violating activity, but to convince Congress, courts, and most
importantly the people, that those acts are legally legitimate. Furthermore,
the potentially endless ratcheting effect of this pattern should be obvious.
The more that presidents act in zone two or three, the more constitutional
such behavior becomes from the exclusivist perspective, hence the fewer deterrents on such behavior in the future. 99 In short, the exclusivist reading of
evolving history's constitutional significance in the realm of wiretapping is
far from the best, let alone the only plausible, reading. Rather, such reading
appears to rest on a deeply underexamined and ultimately mistaken
premise-that capacity equals prerogative in the realm of presidential power.
2. Secrecy.-The previous subpart addresses only those aspects of midtwentieth-century wiretapping policies that were publicly known while in
place. Yet the President's capacity to keep secrets is an important part of the
story as well. First, the FDR administration initially kept the fact of wiretapping a secret. Second, while the fact of wiretapping eventually became
known, FDR and his successors dramatically misrepresented its scope and
nature for decades. As this history demonstrates, the President's capacity for
secret keeping enables him to dissemble about the existence and scope of
programs.
This helps presidents to obtain years of congressional
"acquiescence" that future presidents can cite as precedent of constitutional
magnitude.
As the previous section discussed, the FDR administration
acknowledged publicly that it wiretapped. 100 Yet it was not consistently so

97. See supra 77-83 and accompanying text (chronicling years of wiretapping by different
administrations despite debates over the legality of the practice).
98. See, e.g., ATHAN THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS 132 (1978) (recounting the effects
on the Executive Branch of heightened public concern for the rule of law in the wake of the
Vietnam War and Watergate); Justice Department Bans Wiretapping; Jackson Acts on Hoover
Recommendation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1940, at Al (reporting that Attorney General Jackson's

order banning wiretapping might have been in response to backlash after the practice began
becoming public).
99. See Marshall, supra note 84, at 510 ("Presidential power inevitably expands because of the
way Executive Branch precedent is used to support later exercises of power."); id. at 511, 521
(explaining that only presidential uses of power tend to be cited as constitutional precedent, whereas
presidential abstentions are often overlooked).
100. See supra notes 37, 43 and accompanying text.
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forthcoming. While the Nardone cases were decided in December 1937 and
December 1939, the Administration did not publicly acknowledge that it
wiretapped until March 1940, shortly after Robert Jackson became Attorney
General.' 0 1 In his public statement to this effect, Jackson indicated that he
would henceforth suspend wiretapping because, "[u]nder the existing state of
the law [wiretapping] cannot be done unless Congress sees fit to modify the
existing statutes."10 2 On May 31, 1940, Jackson wrote to Congress. Quoting
his earlier lament about the "existing state of the law," he urged Congress to
pass legislation enabling the Justice Department to wiretap in a limited class
of cases including kidnapping, extortion, racketeering, and national defense
matters such as espionage and sabotage. 0 3 Yet while Jackson apparently did
suspend the program in March of 1940,104 it was soon reauthorized pursuant
to President Roosevelt's order of May 21, 1940.105 While the Justice
10 6
Department acknowledged by late 1941 that it was again wiretapping,
Jackson's May 31, 1940, plea to Congress and similar Administration statements of the time reflect a short-lived effort to keep the program a secret
until new legislation could be procured.'0 7
Furthermore, while the FDR Administration eventually acknowledged
the fact of wiretapping and later administrations followed suit, 10 8 it is now
well-known that administrations wildly misrepresented the scope of their
wiretapping activities for decades. Administrations repeatedly explained that
they wiretapped under careful procedural controls and only in a very limited
class of cases involving a handful of specified crimes including espionage,
sabotage, and kidnapping. 109 Attorney General Brownell epitomized the public face taken by administrations when he insisted in a 1954 law review
article that "[e]xperience demonstrates that the [FBI] has never abused the
101. See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at 1048 (citing the Administration's March 1940
public acknowledgment and its pledge to ban wiretapping going forward); Justice DepartmentBans
Wiretapping, supra note 98 (citing Administration's March 1940 admission and pledge to ban
wiretapping from that point on).
102. JusticeDepartmentBans Wiretapping,supra note 98.
103. Wiretappingfor National Defense: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,76th
Cong. 1-2 (1940) (statement of Robert Jackson, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
104. JACKSON, supra note 77, at 68.
105. THEOHARIS supra note 98, at 98-99.
106. Biddle Approves FBI Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1941, at A4; see also J. Edgar
Hoover, Rejoinder by Mr. Hoover, 58 YALE L.J. 422, 422-24 (1949) (providing examples of public
acknowledgements by Administration members of wiretapping); Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at
1056-59 (citing inconsistent public signals from the Administration from early- to mid-1941).
107. See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at 1052-54 (describing Jackson's effort to keep the
program a secret).
108. See supra subpart III(A).
109. See, e.g., 1962 Wiretapping Hearing, supra note 76, at 11-12 (statement of Robert
Kennedy, Att'y Gen. of the United States); THEOHARIS, supra note 98, at 102 (citing Justice
Department statements that wiretapping is strictly controlled); Brownell, supra note 73, at 199-200,
207-08 (claiming that wiretapping has been strictly limited across administrations); Hoover, supra
note 106, at 424 (asserting that the FBI only conducted surveillance under rigid supervision in cases
of extreme emergency).
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wiretap authority. Its record of 'nonpartisan, nonpolitical, tireless and efficient service over the years gives ample assurance that the innocent will not
suffer in the process of the Bureau's alert protection of the Nation's
safety."'10
Of course, a very different reality came to light in the 1970s.
Investigations sparked by Nixon Administration scandals brought to light
shocking abuses of wiretapping and of intelligence gathering generally by
every administration since that of FDR."1 Over the years, these revelations
have filled volumes of primary and secondary literature. For example, the
report of the Church Committee-the 1970s Senate investigative committee
headed by Senator Frank Church and charged with investigating intelligenqecommunity abuses-observed that "[b]y 1938, the FBI was investigating alleged subversive infiltration of: the maritime industry; the steel industry; the
coal industry; the clothing, garment, and fur industries; the automobile
industry; the newspaper field; educational institutions; organized labor
Negroes; youth groups; Government affairs; and the armed
organizations;
12
'

forces." "

As this history illustrates, the presidential capacity to act in secret can
easily be abused. As with the presidential capacity to self-initiate, past
abuses of secrecy by no means clearly support exclusivity. To the contrary,
they remind us of the wisdom of subjecting the President's capacities to
statutory limits and interbranch oversight. Secrecy-fueled historical abuses
also heighten the folly of equating congressional acquiescence with congressional support for exclusivity. History suggests that such acquiescence is
often facilitated in part by Congress's ignorance about past or ongoing secret
activities.1 13
3. Accountability.-Thus far, I have used terms such as "presidency"
and "presidential power" to describe the person, acts, and powers not only of
the President but of his advisors and of others within the Executive Branch
that act or purport to act under color of presidential authority. This usage is a
product of the reality that at any given time there are countless individuals
who exercise the presidency's structural capacities-such as the ability to
self-initiate and to do so in relative secrecy-and its claimed legal

110. Brownell, supra note 73, at 207.
111. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 87, at 4-8 (describing how the death of J. Edgar Hoover
and the Watergate scandal led to the disclosure of records detailing decades of surveillance by the
FBI); KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT 1-2, 11-17, 41-44, 94-

99 (1996) (recounting the 1970s investigations that revealed decades of surveillance abuses);
THEOHARIS, supra note 98, at 9-13 (discussing the 1970s investigations of intelligence activities
and the political climate and scandals that helped to generate them).
112. S.REP. NO. 94-755, at 32 (1976).
113. See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at 1067-68 (questioning the precedential value of

presidential actions taken secretly).
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prerogatives.'14 As a result, the President may either genuinely not know of15
acts taken in his name or retain plausible deniability regarding the same.'
This bears on exclusivity in an important respect. As we have seen, a key
aspect of exclusivity is its conflation of the President's capacity to act energetically with a legal prerogative to do the same regardless of statutory
restrictions. Yet exclusivists frequently bolster this analytical move with assurance that the rule of law will be maintained by the President's political
accountability. If Americans are unhappy with how he exercises his power,
they can retaliate against him or his political allies at the ballot box.' 16 Yet
such assurances do not measure up to the realities of a sprawling Executive
Branch and intelligence infrastructure. The accountability-defeating features
of these realities are bolstered by the presidency's structural capacity for
secrecy, which can obscure chains of responsibility both during and after an
activity or program.
In the case of wiretapping, some striking examples of presidential
ignorance involve J. Edgar Hoover's misleading communications to
Presidents FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower. With respect to FDR, Hoover
apparently encouraged FDR's belief that the latter's wiretapping authorizaYet
tions did not cover surveillance of "subversive activities. '
to
applied
were
authorizations
that
the
ensured
Hoover
FDR,
unbeknownst to
18
and
Truman
Presidents
To
subversive activities very broadly defined.'
Eisenhower, Hoover represented that FDR had authorized subversiveactivities surveillance." 19 Truman and Eisenhower each approved such

114. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative
State: A CriticalLook at the Practiceof PresidentialControl, 105 MICH. L. REv. 47, 49-50, 65-70,
93-94 (2006) (explaining that many players, sometimes with conflicting agendas, exercise
"presidential" oversight of agency policy making); Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks, supra
note 17, at 892-93 (noting that several million government employees and contractors have some
form of classification authority).
115. See GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STATE 52 (2010) (noting that the concentration of emergency powers in the Executive
Branch increases the number of individuals who "say they can speak for the President" and thus
provide plausible deniability); Bressman & Vandenberg, supra note 114, at 78-84, 93-94
(presenting survey results showing that EPA personnel believe that White House pressure on the
EPA comes from different and sometimes competing White House offices and is not visible to the
public); Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1741, 1763 (stating that a
President can distance himself from unpopular actions and also can be genuinely "out of the loop");
Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances:The Case of
PresidentialReview of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 172-73, 207-08 (1995) (criticizing
George H.W. Bush's Council on Competitiveness as a vehicle to influence agency regulatory
decisions while retaining plausible deniability for the President).
116. See, e.g., Minority Report, supra note 9, at 460 (citing the President's political
accountability).
117. Katyal & Caplan, supranote 37, at 1039.
118. THEOHARIS, supra note 98, at 66-76; Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at 1039; Athan G.
Theoharis, The FBI's Stretching of PresidentialDirectives, 1936-1953, 91 POL. SCI. Q. 649, 65461 (Winter 1976-1977).
119. Theoharis, supra note 118, at 652.
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the misconception that they were reaffirming
surveillance based partly on
0
what FDR had authorized.12
History is also rife with examples of the intentional provision for
For
presidential plausible deniability regarding intelligence gathering.
example, Athan Theoharis reports that the Carter Justice Department decided
not to prosecute former CIA officials for illegal mail opening on the basis
that "executive approval .. .could not be established because, under the
practice of 'plausible deniability' or 'presidential deniability,' no 'written
records [were made] of presidential authorizations of sensitive intelligencegathering operations. ' ' "12' In the realm of intelligence gathering, presidents
and administration officials long have sought to minimize written directives
or otherwise take steps to protect presidential deniability.122 The importance
of deniability is illustrated by a standoff between President Hoover and
President Nixon. Hoover, sensitive to increasing public and congressional
skepticism over surveillance activities, sought to avoid personal responsibility for certain programs (including but not limited to certain wiretapping
programs) by demanding that the President or the Attorney General sign off
on them in writing. 23 Not surprisingly, President Nixon refused this
request. 24 Adding a final twist to the uncertain lines of responsibility that
this confrontation reflects, the Intelligence Community proceeded to engage
in some of the activities on which Nixon had refused to sign off,
despite
12
Nixon's apparent belief that his refusal had been their death knell. 1
Ironically, then, the blanket of broad secrecy and discretion that
exclusivity justifies can help to defeat the accountability that exclusivists
trumpet. This lesson pokes additional holes in the notion that a history of
presidential initiative or congressional acquiescence supports exclusivity.
For one thing, it is not always so clear that acts of "presidential" initiative are
acts of the President's initiative. Furthermore, it often is difficult if not impossible for Congress or others to discern what the President--or others
acting under color of presidential power-knew or did and when they knew
or did it. The latter reflects the problems in equating congressional acquiescence with a knowing embrace of exclusivity. More so, it undercuts the

120. Id. at 649, 661-68, 671-72.
121. THEOHARIS, supra note 98, at xiii.
122. Id. at xi-xiii; see also, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 119 (1978) (dissenting views on
H.R. 7308) ("In reviewing the abuses of the past, it can be seen that the method used by senior

executive branch officials to try to escape responsibility was by establishing 'plausible
deniability."'); Simon Chesterman, Secrets and Lies: Intelligence Activities and the Rule of Law in

Times of Crisis, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 553, 566 (2007) (describing origins and more expansive later
uses of plausible deniability).
123. THEOHARIS, supra note 98, at 19.
124. Id. at 30-34 (describing Nixon's insistence on retaining "plausible deniability" in the face
of Hoover's request for specific authorization).
125. Id. at 13-14, 19, 32-39.
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notion that accountability counterbalances excesses that might otherwise
flow from exclusivity.
B. The Near Absence of Exclusivity in the Debates of the Time
The second major premise underlying exclusivist uses of evolving
history is that Congress until recently took a hands-off approach to national
security and foreign policy, and that this reflects a traditional acceptance of
exclusivity by the political branches.
In an. important two-article series, Professors David Barron and Martin
Lederman challenge this premise. First, they demonstrate that Congress has
repeatedly passed legislation constraining the President's conduct of military
campaigns from the Founding Era through the present. 1 6 They also
demonstrate that presidents almost never made explicit zone three
arguments-that is, arguments defending the legality of national security actions taken against statutory authority on the basis of their Commander in
Chief or Executive Power-prior to the mid-twentieth century. 27 This was
so even when presidents "confronted problematic restrictions, some of which
could not be fully interpreted away and some of which even purported to
regulate troop deployments and the actions of troops already deployed."' 2 8
Exclusivity thus was relatively silent within the political branches until the
mid-twentieth century. This Part examines the sound of that silence as it relates to wiretapping while the Telecommunications Act of 1934 remained in
effect.
Secondary accounts reflect that FDR did not argue that he had a
constitutional prerogative to wiretap in the face of contrary statutory
authority. 29 Rather, he claimed that wiretapping was not statutorily prohibited in all cases. In his May 21, 1940, directive ordering Attorney General
Jackson to reauthorize wiretapping, FDR explained his narrow reading of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Telecommunications Act of 1934 in
the Nardone cases, stating, "I am convinced that the Supreme Court never
intended any dictum in the particular case which it decided to apply to grave
matters involving the defense of the nation.' 1 30 Attorneys general in subse-

126. Barron & Lederman I, supra note 1, at 693, 696-97, 704-15; Barron & Lederman II,
supra note 1, at 947-48, 951-52, 996-97, 1009-15, 1027, 1058-59; cf Baron & Lederman I, supra
note 1, at 772-86 (noting that actions of the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War
and texts of post-revolution state constitutions reflected the understanding that legislatures could
direct details of military campaigns waged by the "commanders-in-chief').
127. Barron & Lederman I, supra note 1, at 697, 718-20, 763-64; Barron & Lederman II,
supra note 1, at 948-49, 952, 993-94, 999-1004, 1007-09, 1015-16, 1027, 1034-35, 1057-58.
128. Barron & Lederman II, supra note 1, at 948.
129. THEOHARIS, supra note 98, at 99; see also Barron & Lederman II, supra note 1, at 1052
(chronicling near absence of any exclusivity claims by the FDR Administration); Katyal & Caplan,
supra note 37, at 1049-52 (citing the FDR Administration's arguments, all grounded in statutory
interpretation).
130. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 37, at 1050 (quoting FDR's memorandum to Jackson).
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quent administrations also relied on statutory 1 interpretation
claims, which
31
they articulated publicly, to defend wiretapping.
That exclusivity was outside the bounds of mainstream legal thought at
the time is exemplified by a fascinating exchange in the pages of the Yale
Law Journal in 1949. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover wrote a letter to the
journal challenging statements made in a December 1948 article about FBI
practices.1 32 In his letter, Hoover noted that "'the FBI does tap telephones in
a very limited type of cases."", 33 The authors of the original article called
Hoover's "admission" of wiretapping an "astounding statement" in light of
Section 605's prohibition on intercepting and divulging wiretapped
information. 34 In a rejoinder to the authors' written response, Hoover
explained that he had "never attempted to keep [his] views on this subject a
secret," citing public statements by himself and other administration officials
throughout the 1940s. 135 As was typical of administration statements
supporting wiretapping in the mid-twentieth century, Hoover did not even
hint at the possibility that the President could legally circumvent statutory
constraints. Rather, he reiterated the Administration's public position that
Section 605 prohibited the introduction
of wiretap-derived evidence but did
36
not outlaw wiretapping itself.
In congressional hearings on wiretapping during World War II, 137 the
sole invocation of exclusivity that I found by an administration official is a
statement by Attorney General Francis Biddle during a 1942 House Judiciary
Committee hearing. Biddle explained that he had already "publicly made
clear" his position that Section 605 does not prohibit wiretapping. 3' He
added that he believed his views to be consistent with those of his
predecessor, former Attorney General Jackson.139 Yet, "since there [was]
some confusion and some doubt on the matter," Biddle concluded that it
would be "extremely valuable for the Congress to clarify [wiretapping
authority] in legislation."'' 40 To this, Biddle added his belief that

13 1. See, e.g., 1962 Wiretapping Hearings, supra note 76, at 12-13 (statement of Robert
Kennedy, Att'y Gen. of the United States) (explaining that under then current law, wiretapping in
itself, without subsequent disclosure, was not a crime); Brownell, supra note 73, at 199-200
(arguing that the Telecommunications Act does not make wiretapping a crime in its own right).
132. Thomas 1. Emerson & David M. Helfeld, Reply By the Authors, 58 YALE L.J. 412, 413

(1949).
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 413 (quoting Hoover's letter).
Id. at 413-15.
Hoover, supra note 106, at 422-23.
Id. at 424.

137. See infra note 147 for description of the scope of my search of congressional hearings on

wiretapping during the World War II period.
138. Authorizing Wire Tapping in the Prosecutionof the War: Hearing on H.R. 283 Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary,77th Cong. 2 (1942) [hereinafter Authorizing Wire Tapping] (statement

of Francis Biddle, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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Congress perhaps could not, and certainly would not, wish to prevent
the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, making
use, in time of war, of the right to tap wires. I think it is very doubtful,
if the Commander in Chief found it was essential as a military matter
to do this in wartimes, whether the legislative branch of the
that, and I am certain they would not
Government could interfere14with
1
wish to, even if they could.

These thoughts, to which Biddle made no further reference in his
testimony, comprise an exception that proves the rule of exclusivity's general
absence from the legal and political debates of the time. For one thing,
Biddle's brief statement sits in relative isolation among his own more copious body of statutory arguments to Congress on wiretapping in both the
hearing just cited and his 1941 confirmation hearing before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. 14 2 That body of arguments comprises the standard
refrain of the FDR and subsequent administrations: that Section 605 does not
prohibit wiretapping, that Congress should nonetheless "clarify" the right to
permitting some wiretapwiretap, and that Congress should pass legislation
143
derived evidence to be introduced in court.
Furthermore, the overall tenor of Biddle's comments on wiretapping
legislation strongly reinforces the notion that his exclusivist statement was
directed at most to extraordinary cases within a normative constitutional
context of legislative control. For example, following his exclusivist remark,
Biddle discussed the desirability of legislation to clarify the right to wiretap
and to allow the limited introduction of wiretap-derived evidence. 144 He

141. Id.
142. Id. at 2-4; see also Hearing on Biddle Nomination Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 77th
Cong. (1941) [hereinafter Biddle Nomination]. Barron and Lederman make a similar finding about
Biddle's relationship to exclusivity during his tenure as Attorney General. In their review, they
found only one exclusivist remark by Biddle (or by anyone in the FDR administration, for that
matter)-a comment made "in an almost offhand manner" during a Supreme Court oral argument
about the power to try enemy combatants via military commission. Barron & Lederman II, supra
note 1, at 1055. Barron and Lederman explain that, while Biddle's remark was unusual for the time
and stood out even within his own larger body of arguments, it "nonetheless [stood] as an indication
that [exclusivity]" was beginning to make "inroads in the political branches." Id. at 1055-56.
143. See, e.g., Authorizing Wire Tapping, supra note 138, at 2-4 (stating that Section 605 does
not prevent wiretapping but that it prohibits the introduction of its fruits into evidence, stressing that
legislation should be passed narrowing the right to wiretap and permitting wiretap-derived evidence
to be used in court); Biddle Nomination, supra note 142, at 5-6, 10 (explaining his support for
limited wiretapping and his view that Congress should pass a law that permits wiretapping but
limits its scope and enables Congress to oversee its use); 1962 Wiretapping Hearings, supra
note 76, at 11-13 (statement of Robert Kennedy, Att'y Gen. of the United States) (stating that
Section 605 does not prohibit wiretapping but that it prevents wiretap-derived evidence from being
introduced in court, urging the passage of legislation to narrow wiretapping's permitted uses and
allow the introduction of wiretap-derived evidence); Brownell, supra note 73, at 199-203 (citing
Biddle's views on the meaning of Section 605 and on the need for new legislation, noting that
Biddle's views have been shared by all subsequent Attorney Generals including Brownell).
144. See Authorizing Wire Tapping, supra note 138, at 3-4 (statement of Francis Biddle, Att'y
Gen. of the United States) (recommending passage of House Joint Resolution 283 to clarify the
legality of wiretapping and permit the introduction of evidence from wiretaps).
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noted that "it puts a much greater control in the Congress if they wish at any
time-if they think at any time it has been abused-to withdraw that
power." 14 5 Similarly, Biddle spoke of the importance of congressional oversight as a tool by which Congress 146could determine if any legislative
wiretapping authority has been abused.
Most tellingly, Biddle's lone statement marked the only clear reference,
and certainly the only approving one, to exclusivity in the several congressional hearings held to consider authorizing wiretapping during and shortly
prior to America's entry into World War l1. 147 Overall, statements of
witnesses and questioners alike in these hearings were premised on the
assumption that it is for Congress (in conjunction with the President's veto
power) to decide on the proper scope, if any, of a national security wiretapping power.1 48 The apparent foreignness of exclusivist reasoning to most
hearing participants is captured in an exchange between Congressman Earl
C. Michener of Michigan, who spoke favorably of granting the President
statutory authority to wiretap for national security purposes, and a witness
from the ACLU who deemed wiretapping, and hence legislative authorization for the same, undesirable. The ACLU witness suggested that it might be
less dangerous to liberty for a president to violate a statute in a moment of
true emergency than for Congress to formally broaden the President's statu-

145. Id. at 4.
146. See Biddle Nomination, supra note 142, at 6, 10 (statement of Francis Biddle, Att'y Gen.
of the United States) (remarking that any wiretapping should be reported regularly to Congress).
147. According to LexisNexis Congressional, there were several congressional hearings on

wiretapping between the start of World War II (including before America's entry into the War) and
the War's end. Hearings by the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee (ICC) focused
predominantly on allegations of state and private wiretapping and did not discuss the President's
power to wiretap in any depth. See generally Investigation of Alleged Wire Tapping, Part 1:
Hearing on S. 224 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Interstate Commerce Comm., 76th Cong. (1940);
Investigation of Alleged Wire Tapping, Part2: Hearing on S. 224 Before the Subcomm. of the S.
Interstate Commerce Comm., 76th Cong. (1940); Investigation of Alleged Wire Tapping, Part3:
Hearing on S. 224 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Interstate Commerce Comm., 76th Cong. (1941)

(focusing on state and private wiretapping, based on a reading of large portions of the transcripts as
well as an electronic word search of the transcripts for the terms "president," "commander," "chief,"
"constitution," "article ii," "article 2," "article two," "second article," and "executive power"). The
remaining hearings listed by LexisNexis Congressional are more relevant to my focus on the role
(or relative lack thereof) of presidential exclusivity in World War II Era congressional hearings on
wiretapping. Those hearings are thus my main points of reference. They are Authorizing Wire
Tapping in the Prosecution of the War, Part 1: Hearing on H.J. Res. 283 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 77th Cong. (1942) [hereinafter Authorizing Wire Tapping Part 1];Authorizing Wire
Tapping in the Prosecution of the War, Part2: Hearing on H.J.Res. 283 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 77th Cong. (1942) [hereinafter Authorizing Wire Tapping Part2]; To Authorize Wire
Tapping: Hearing on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary,77th Cong. (1941); and Wire Tapping for National Defense: Hearing on H.J. Res. 553
Before Subcomm. No. I of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,76th Cong. (1940). I also refer at points

to relevant parts of Francis Biddle's 1941 confirmation hearing as Attorney General before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Biddle Nomination, supra note 142.
148. See generallysupra note 147.
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tory powers. 149 Michener expressed shock, asking, "[y]ou believe, then, that
the Chief Executive, regardless of the Constitution, should just go and do that
which he thinks is best and pay no attention to the Congress or the
Constitution?"15 0 Suffice it to say, neither Michener, the ACLU witness, nor
other participants in or following the exchange suggested that the President
5
could constitutionally override legislation in the name of national security. '
Debates over Section 605 and possible amendments thereto belie the
exclusivist premise that Congress's acquiescence (in this case, its failure for
decades to pass legislation clarifying the contours of presidential wiretapping
power) reflects its belief that it may not constitutionally constrain the
President in the realm of national security. To the contrary, the debates of
the time, including congressional hearings directly addressing wartime wiretapping, overwhelmingly evince the assumption 52that national security
wiretapping is a matter for legislative policymaking.1
The hearings on wartime wiretapping also indicate that many who
opposed amending Section 605 did so because they deemed the murky status
quo a lesser evil than legislation clearly granting or expanding presidential
wiretapping powers.153 Thus, Congress's failure to pass new legislation during World War II, or for years beyond that, 54 hardly reflects an exclusivist
consensus. Further, the fact that presidents continued to wiretap for decades
in the face of their controversial statutory interpretations and Congress's inertia reflects the phenomenon discussed in the previous section: the
149. See To Authorize Wire Tapping, supra note 147, at 199 (statement of Osmond Fraenkel,
American Civil Liberties Union) (noting with apparent approval that during the Civil War Lincoln
acted outside the law, and although emergency circumstances may have justified his actions,
Lincoln "did not seek to have the law changed" or to "have a great principle of constitutional
government disregarded").
150. Id.
151. In his testimony, the ACLU witness stated,
I regret any deviation from the law, but I say this, just as I would rather have somebody
lose his temper occasionally and do a cruel act than have somebody do a cruel act in
cold blood. So I say if in a moment of intense crisis it is believed that something has to
be done, human nature is such that it will be done and afterward it will be judged.
Id. (statement of Osmond Fraenkel, American Civil Liberties Union)
152. See supra notes 129-151 and accompanying text. For additional statements evincing this
assumption in the wartime congressional hearings, see, e.g., To Authorize Wire Tapping, supra note
147, at 2-5 (statement of Rep. Francis E. Walter, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (arguing for
legislation that would give the power to authorize wiretapping to the courts rather than to the
executive department); id. at 21-29 (statement of Rep. Sam Hobbs) (contending that Congress
should grant to the federal government--"whose sole responsibility is to enforce the laws
[Congress] write[s]"-the authority to conduct wiretaps); id. at 214-17 (statement of Rep. John H.
Coffee) (emphasizing that executive investigative agencies should only be able to exercise the
"great power" of wiretapping if Congress gives it to them).
153. See, e.g., id. at 204-05 (statement of S.D. Kapelsohn, National Federation for
Constitutional Liberties) (opposing the proposed amendment on the ground that wiretapping should
not be statutorily authorized unless its proponents can demonstrate why it is necessary).
154. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 74, at 16 (stating in 1968 that "[d]uring the past 40
years numerous bills to authorize limited forms of wiretapping have been considered by Congress
but none has ever been enacted").
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President's structural capacity to make policy by default. As we have seen,
this phenomenon, too, hardly provides logical support for exclusivity.
IV. Presidential Exclusivity from the Omnibus Crime Act Through Today:
A Growing Tool of the Imperial Presidency
A.

The Omnibus Crime Bill Through FISA

Congress finally elaborated on the law of wiretapping in the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968. The Act permitted the Attorney
General or a designated Assistant Attorney General to authorize federal
agents to apply for federal court warrants to wiretap in investigating particular crimes.15 5 Covered crimes included the national security related offenses
of espionage, sabotage, and treason. 156 Section 2511(3) of the Act included a
vague reservation of power to the President, resolving that:
Nothing contained [herein] shall limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a
foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States, or to protect nationalsecurity information against foreign intelligence activities.
Nor shall anything contained [herein] be deemed to limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of
the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any
other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the
Government.
From the sparse legislative history, recounted by the Supreme Court in
United States v. United States District Court,'57 and from the Government's
own representations in that case, it appears that both Congress and the
Executive Branch interpreted § 2511(3) solely to acknowledge that the
President may have Jacksonian zone two powers and to disclaim an intent to
override the same through legislation. 58 In short, neither political branch
read § 2511(3) as an exclusivist statement denying Congress's constitutional

155. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat.
197, 216 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006)).
156. See id. § 2516(1)(a).
157. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
158. Id. at 303-08 (examining the text and history of the statute and concluding that "nothing in
§ 2511(3) was intended to expand or to contract or to define whatever presidential surveillance
powers existed in matters affecting the national security"); see id. at 339 & n.3 (White, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the Govermnent did not claim that Congress could not constitutionally
restrict the President's capacity to wiretap in the domestic bombing case at issue); id. at 344 ("The
United States concedes that the act of the Attorney General authorizing a warrantless wiretap is
subject to judicial review to some extent ... and it seems improvident to proceed to constitutional
questions until it is determined that the Act itself does not bar the interception here in question.").
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prerogative to restrict the President's power to engage in national security
wiretapping. That exclusivity went unmentioned in the Act's legislative
history despite the concept's obvious relationship to the subject matter suggests that exclusivity was simply off the radar of most political and legal
thinkers of the time.
The scandals that unfolded a few years after the Act's passage appeared
to impact exclusivity's relationship to mainstream discourse in two major
ways. On the one hand, the scandals of the Watergate era-including revelations that every administration since that of FDR had dramatically abused
wiretapping-likely stunted any near-term chance of mainstream respectability for exclusivity. Yet in the longer run, the controversies of the 1970s
invigorated and inspired exclusivists. For example, former Vice President
and avid TSA defender Dick Cheney has frequently cited his dismay at postWatergate restrictions on presidential power, including FISA.5 9 This dismay
helped to inspire his contributions (in collaboration with another future TSA
co-architect, David Addington) to the Iran Contra Minority Report, an exclusivist classic.160 Similar reactions were had elsewhere within government,
academia, and think tanks, as exemplified by another work mentioned above,
the American Enterprise Institute's collection of essays, The Fettered
Presidency.161 Exclusivity's nascent presence can be spotted in the
legislative record underlying FISA. In the hearing transcripts and committee
and conference reports from 1976-1978 that I reviewed, 62 the strongest
exclusivist position is staked out by Robert Bork. In a 1978 House Judiciary
Committee hearing, Bork concludes that FISA "probably" violates
Article 11.163 With respect to war and foreign affairs, Bork reasons that
Congress's powers are constitutionally "confined to the major issues, issues
such as whether or not to declare war and how large the armed forces shall

159. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 50, at 154-55; Devins, supra note 84, at 396, 411-13.
160. See, e.g., SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 50, at 154-61 (describing Cheney's disapproval of
the "erosion of presidential power" and how it influenced his contribution to the Minority Report).
161. See Robert H. Bork, Forewardto THE FETrERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 60, at ix (noting
that the articles contained in the book "demonstrate that the office of the president of the United
States has been significantly weakened in recent years"); see also, e.g., Tower, supra note 60, at 230
(lamenting the decline of presidential power after the Vietnam War).
162. Using the LexisNexis Congressional Database, I obtained the 1976, 1977, and 1978
congressional hearings held on FISA. While the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees of both
chambers held hearings, I read only the Judiciary Committee hearings to keep the project

manageable. I thus read and summarized hearings of the House Judiciary Committee from 1976
and 1978 and of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1976 and 1977. I also read and summarized
the Joint Explanatory Report of the Committee of Conference No. 95-1720 (1978); the Senate
Intelligence Committee Report No. 95-701 (1978); the House Intelligence Committee Report No.
95-1283 (1978); and the Senate Judiciary Committee Report including Minority Views No. 95-604
(1977).
163. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings on H.R. 7308 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong. 131
(1978) [hereinafter FISA Hearings1].
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be."'64 What Congress may not do is "dictate the President's tactics" in these
areas, such as how the President conducts intelligence surveillance. 165 While
Bork's view received a few nods of support in the hearings, 166 most of those
who raised Article Il-based objections recognized a significant regulatory
and oversight role for Congress. Their concern was the power that FISA67
accorded the Judiciary to grant or deny intelligence-gathering warrants.1
Even Bork suggested that Congress could play a robust oversight role to ensure that administrations complied with their internal regulations. 68 Bork
also supported
subjecting non-compliant administrations to civil or criminal
69
sanctions.'

Of course, the view that ultimately prevailed was that Congress was
well within its power to pass FISA. This view was represented in much of
the congressional testimony.170 For example, Attorney General Edward Levi
of the Ford Administration testified that, while there was some core of
Presidential power that Congress could not infringe, FISA's restrictions fell

164. Id. at 138.
165. Id.
166. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976: Hearing on S. 743, S. 1888, and S.
3197 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 2 (1976) [hereinafter FISA Hearings I] (statement of Sen. McClellan, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures) (recounting his judgment at the time of the 1974
hearings that if past presidents had derived the power to wiretap from "the Constitution, no statute
could change or alter it" and recalling that "the then Attorney General, Mr. Saxbe, and the FBI

Director, Mr. Kelley, expressed the same judgment in their [1974] testimony").
167. See FISA Hearings I, supra note 163, at 24-28, 48 (statement of Rep. McClory, Member,
U.S. House of Representatives) (opining that statutory regulation and congressional oversight are
"entirely appropriate," although the President has some exclusive powers under Article II; his
objection to the bill was its concession of a role for the courts); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 2, at
114-21 (1978) (dissenting views of Reps. Wilson, McClory, Robinson, and Ashbrook on H.R.
7308) (arguing that statutory regulation of the area and congressional oversight are appropriate, but
that a judicial role is not appropriate); S. REP. No. 95-701, at 91-96 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4042-48 (additional views of Sen. Wallop) (contending that the bill improperly
checks presidential power through ex ante judicial intervention; ex post congressional review would
be a more constitutionally appropriate check).
168. See FISA Hearings I, supra note 163, at 131, 144-46 (statement of Robert Bork, former
Solicitor General of the United States) (noting that Congress will oversee Executive Branch
enforcement of its internal regulations so there is no "need to worry about future administrations
just changing [those regulations] without anybody in Congress knowing about them").
169. Id. at 144.
170. See, e.g., id. at 3-4, 7-8 (statement of Griffin B. Bell, Att'y Gen. of the United States); id.
at 158 (statement of Jerry Berman, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union); id. at 8183 (statement by Senator Edward Kennedy); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the

Judiciary, 94th Cong. 23-24 (1976) (statement of Philip A. Lacovera, former Deputy Solicitor
General); id. at 38-39 (statement of John Shattuck, National Staff Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union); id. at 40-41 (statement of Dr. Morton Halperin, Director, Project on National
Security and Civil Liberties); id. at 61, 69 (statement of William Van Alstyne, Professor, Duke
University); id. at 75-76 (statement of Louis Henkin, Professor of International Law and
Diplomacy, Columbia University); FISA HearingsII, supra note 166, at 16-20, 23-24 (statement of
Edward Levi, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
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within an area that Congress could regulate. 7 ' With respect to this area, Levi
explained that, even if the President had. inherent power to act absent congressional action (in short, to take zone two action), Congress could
constitutionally regulate such acts (thus placing contrary activity in zone
three).172 As such, Levi affirmed that his and future administrations would
be constitutionally obliged to abide by FISA's terms. 173 This view was also
reflected in the fact that Congress removed a so-called "disclaimer" provision that had appeared in an earlier FISA bill. 174 The disclaimer, similar to
that in the 1968 Omnibus Crime Act, had disavowed any intent to "limit the
constitutional power of the President to order electronic surveillance" in certain cases "if the facts and circumstances giving rise to such order are
beyond" FISA's terms. 75 The disclaimer's defenders, including Levi, had
deemed it simply a statement of neutrality as to the President's constitutional
powers in areas not covered by FISA. 1 76 Yet disclaimer opponents-who
had expressed concern that it would be invoked as a "blank check" by future
administrations'77--caried the day when Congress removed the provision
171. FISA HearingsII, supra note 166, at 16-20, 23-25 (statement of Edward Levi, Att'y Gen.
of the United States).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 16.
174. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm.
on CriminalLaws & Proceduresof the S. JudiciaryComm., 95th Cong. 14-15 (1977) (statement of
Griffin Bell, Att'y Gen. of the United States) (citing the provision's removal approvingly); S. REP.
No. 95-604, at 82-83 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3966 (minority views of Sen.
Abourezk) (citing the provision's removal approvingly).
175. FISA Hearing11, supra note 166, at 134 (quoting S. 3197, 94th Cong. § 2528 (1976)).
176. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence SurveillanceAct: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, & Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 92 (1976)
(statement of Edward H. Levi, Att'y Gen. of the United States) (explaining that the provision "inno
way expands or contracts the President's constitutional powers"); FISA HearingsII, supra note 166,
at 17-18, 25 (statement of Edward H. Levi, Att'y Gen. of the United States) (interpreting the
provision as a statement of congressional neutrality regarding the scope of the President's powers in
areas not covered by FISA).
177. See, e.g., FISA Hearings 11, supra note 166, at 30-31 (statement of Morton H. Halperin,
American Civil Liberties Union) (suggesting that the disclaimer "would be read, in fact... as going
beyond . . . neutrality ... and, in fact, endorsing the notion that there is a power here to wiretap,
without a warrant"); id. at 35-36 (statement of John Shattuck, American Civil Liberties Union) ("I
think it is a mistake, a very serious and grave mistake for anyone who is considering this bill to
think that it is neutral on the point of Presidential powers ....");id. at 66, 69 (statement of
Professor Phillip Heymann, Harvard Law School) (expressing concern that the disclaimer is subject
to abuse and stating his preference to eliminate it or at minimum to narrow it substantially); id. at 67
(statement of Professor Herman Schwartz, Law School, State University of New York at Buffalo)
("[I]t seems to me that what this disclaimer does is to give the President a virtual blank check, and
says Congress agrees that he has a blank check when he is dealing with matters affecting foreign
affairs not within the scope of this statute."); id.at 69 (statement of Dean Louis H. Pollak,
University of Pennsylvania School of Law) ("[I]f the Congress wishes simply to reflect its
awareness that there may be a claim of inherent Presidential power, then it should couch a waiver, I
believe, not in terms which are open to Professor Schwartz's concern that Congress is in effect
acknowledging the constitutional claim"); id. at 71, 74-76 (statement of Sen. Nelson) (suggesting
that the disclaimer raises concerns similar to that raised by the disclaimer in the Omnibus Crime
Act, which the previous Administration had interpreted as a license to "engage in wholesale
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"exclusive means" to conduct electronic surveillance
and labeled FISA the
78
within its coverage.1
B. The FISA Amendments Act of 2008
As the TSP demonstrates, exclusivity had become an influential presence in political and legal circles by the post-9/11 period. To further
illustrate exclusivity's relative political force today, this section briefly recounts exclusivity's role in the 2008 congressional debates over the FISA
Amendments Act (FAA). Specifically, this section considers exclusivity's
role in debates regarding Title II of the Act, which retroactively immunizes
telecommunications providers who cooperated with the TSP from lawsuits,
so long as the providers acted upon a written request "from the Attorney
General or the head of an element of the Intelligence Community (or the
deputy of such person) ... indicating that the activity was (i) authorized by
the President and (ii) determined to be lawful."' 179 In congressional hearings
and reports leading up to the FAA's passage, immunity proponents argued,
among other things, that it would be unfair to punish companies that
"patriotically cooperated with the Government."' 80 Opponents argued that
the telecommunications companies have sophisticated legal staffs who are
equipped to determine the legality of government requests.' 8' They added
that telecommunications companies supported FISA in the 1970s because it
offered them clear legal guidance. 82 Immunity opponents also argued that

electronic surveillance"); id. at 81-83 (statement of Professor Nathan Lewin) (observing that the
disclaimer clause in the Omnibus Crime Act "has continued to be relied upon by the Department of
Justice and by those representing individuals or Government agents who have engaged in electronic
surveillance as a source of statutory or constitutional authority" and that the disclaimer in the
proposed legislation would be used in the same manner).
178. S.REP. No. 95-701, supra note 167, at 71-72; S.REP.No. 95-604, supra note 174, at 6-7;
id. at 83 (minority views of Sen. Abourezk) (praising the Senate Judiciary Committee's removal of

the provision).
179. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 802(a)(4)(B), 122 Stat. 2436,
2468 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1885a).
180. Strengthening FISA: Does the Protect America Act ProtectAmericans' Civil Liberties and
Enhance Security?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 16 (2007)

[hereinafter StrengtheningFISA Hearing] (statement of J. Michael McConnell, Director of National
Intelligence); see also, e.g., FISA Amendments: How to Protect Americans' Security and Privacy
and Preserve the Rule of Law and Government Accountability: Hearingbefore the S, Comm. on the
Judiciary, l10th Cong. 17-18 (2007) [hereinafter FISA Amendments Hearing] (statement of

Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Att'y Gen. for National Security, United States Department of
Justice) (supporting immunity from suit for telecommunications companies who, "acting out of a
sense of patriotic duty," cooperated with government investigatory information requests).
181. FISA Amendments Hearing,supra note 180, at 28 (statement of Sen. Cardin) (noting that
the providers are "sophisticated companies," "large companies with big legal staffs"); id. at 36-38
(statement of Sen. Durbin) (suggesting that companies are capable of determining the legitimacy of
government requests and noting that one company indeed refused to cooperate with the TSP due to
legal concerns).
182. Id. at 59-60 (statement of Morton Halperin, Director of U.S. Advocacy, Open Society
Institute).
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are meant to play a gatekeeper role against government
the companies
18 3
illegality.
Exclusivist arguments helped immunity proponents to prevail in the
final legislation in two major respects. First, as evidenced in congressional
reports from 2007 and 2008, several members of Congress adopted the view
that the TSP was legal from an exclusivist perspective. 184 For example,
Senators Bond, Chambliss, Hatch, and Warner criticized "[t]hose who
constantly harp on the misleading assertion that the TSP was illegal.' 8 5 The
Senators expressed their belief, "without any doubt, that the President prop,
erly used his authority under Article 1 ....
Second, the ubiquity of exclusivist arguments in defense of the TSP
simply muddied the waters. The arguments' presence helped some congresspersons and witnesses to justify immunity without taking a clear stance
on exclusivity. That is, it enabled them to deem questions about the TSP's
legality terribly complex and possibly irresolvable. As such, they suggested
that it would be unwise and unjust to linger on those questions or to allow
litigation about them to proceed. For example, former Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Patrick Philbin told the Senate Judiciary Committee that it
would have been unfair to expect telecommunications companies to examine
the legality of presidential requests to cooperate with the TSP.'87 He explained that "the legal questions ... often involve constitutional questions of
separation of powers that have never been squarely addressed by courts, and
are not readily susceptible for analysis by lawyers at a company whose pri' 88
mary concern is providing communications services to the public."'
Assistant Attorney General for National Security Kenneth Wainstein testified

183. See, e.g., FISA Amendments Hearing, supra note 180, at 46-47 (statement of Edward
Black, President and CEO, Computer and Communications Industry Association) (discussing the
need for companies to resist improper government demands for information); id. at 50 (statement of
Morton H. Halperin, Director of U.S. Advocacy, Open Society Institute) (identifying the importance
of the FISA process in guiding companies as to when to comply with government requests for
information); Strengthening FISA Hearing, supra note 180, at 56 (statement of Suzanne E.
Spaulding, Principal, Bingham Consulting Group) ("telecommunications providers (must be] our

last line of defense against abuse by the government."); S. REP. No. 110-258, at 20 (2008)
(additional views of Sen. Leahy) (explaining that retroactive immunity "would subvert the
gatekeeping role that FISA contemplates for the providers").
184. S.REP. No. 110-258, at 36 (minority statements of Sens. Kyl, Hatch, Grassley, Sessions,
Graham, Cornyn, Cobum & Brownback) ("Congress cannot take away the President's power to
monitor foreign enemies of the United States without a warrant.... To the extent that FISA
purports to do so, it is unconstitutional."); S. REP. No. 110-209, at 35 (2007) (additional statements
of Sens. Bond, Chambliss, Hatch, and Warner) ("Those who constantly harp on the misleading
assertion that the TSP was illegal conveniently ignore federal case law that recognizes the
President's Article II authority to engage in warrantless surveillance in the context of gathering
foreign intelligence.").
185. S.REP. No. 110-209, at 35.
186. Id.
187. FISA Amendments Hearing,supra note 180, at 49 (statement of Patrick F. Philbin, Partner,
Kirkland & Ellis).
188. Id.
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before the same Committee in support of retroactive immunity.I8 9 Wainstein
also opposed Inspector General review of the TSP, deeming it best to "leave
that aside in terms of whether the TSP was within the constitutional authority
of the President or not, legal or '1not,
and just focus on how we're going to fix
90
people."
American
the
for
FISA
Congressional debate over FAA's immunity provisions also reflects an
exclusivist tendency to blur or stretch the concept of "emergency" to suggest
that any number of actions taken over long time periods fall within the
President's emergency prerogatives. This tendency takes the form of
arguments that entail four major steps. First, such arguments start from the
exclusivist premise that the President has a legal prerogative, at least in some
cases, to circumvent statutory limits that interfere with his ability to defend
national security. Second, they involve an assumption or explicit explanation
to the effect that such prerogatives stem in large part from the fact that the
President is the sole constitutional actor who is structurally equipped to respond to emergencies. Third, they categorize a particular challenged action
as an "emergency" action that falls within the President's constitutional
prerogatives. Fourth, they take step three even when the action in question
occurred long after Congress could feasibly have acted, and when the temporal component of the emergency rationale thus is absent.
This exclusivist approach to emergency is illustrated in a book passage
in which John Yoo defends the TSP.' 9' Yoo explains that the Constitution's
framers "created an executive with its own independent powers to manage
foreign affairs and address emergencies which, almost by definition, cannot
be addressed by existing laws .... If ever there were an emergency that

Congress could not prepare for, it was the war brought upon us on 9/11 ,192
The problem with this appeal to emergency is that it seeks to justify a program that went on for years. Even if Yoo's argument could have justified
circumventing FISA in the days immediately following 9/11 (putting aside
the fact that FISA already provided for its own 15-day suspension in the case
of a congressional war declaration), 93 it hardly follows that the appeal to
emergency justifies years of statutory circumvention.
This tendency to stretch the concept of emergency also factored into the
congressional debates on retroactive immunity. For example, the Senate
Intelligence Committee, in a 2007 report on the FAA, supported immunity
based partly on its view that the telecommunications providers had a "good

189. Id. at 7 (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Att'y Gen. for National Security,
United States Department of Justice) (testifying that "as a matter of fundamental fairness and as a
way of ensuring that providers will continue to provide cooperation to our surveillance efforts,"

retroactive immunity is necessary).
190. Id. at 11.
191. Yoo, supra note 7, at 119-20
192. Id.
193. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 111,
92 Stat. 1783,
1796 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006)).
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faith" belief in the TSP's legality.1 94 To reach this view, the Committee considered, among other things, "the extraordinary nature of the time period
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. ' 95 Yet as the
Committee noted in the same report, while the providers received initial
request or directive letters from the government shortly after 9/11, they received renewed requests or directives "at regular intervals" thereafter. 196 On
a note similar to that struck by the Senate Intelligence Committee, Assistant
Attorney General Wainstein stressed, in support of immunity, that the government had contacted the providers "in the aftermath of the worst attack
upon the United States, at least since Pearl Harbor."' 97 Former Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Philbin also testified that "protecting the carriers
who allegedly responded to the government's call for assistance in the wake
of the devastating attacks of 9/11 is simply the right thing to do."' 198
V.

Conclusion

Exclusivists have been remarkably successful over the past several
decades in shepherding exclusivity from a fringe notion to one with
widespread mainstream purchase. Americans may still scoff when presented
with exclusivity in a form as stark as Richard Nixon's infamous line,
"[W]hen the [P]resident does it, that means that it is not illegal."' 99 Yet precisely this notion underscores politically influential arguments to the effect
that the TSP was legal or that its legality is a matter on which reasonable
people can disagree. As we have seen, those arguments have had some success in deterring TSP investigations and in shaping related legislation. Such
arguments are also used to deter future restrictions that exceed administration
preferences. For example, a Justice Department witness told Congress during the 2007 hearings on the FAA that the Bush Administration would not
feel the need to invoke exclusivity to circumvent the FAA if it is satisfied
with the final legislation. 0 0
There are descriptive lessons to be gleaned from exclusivity's rise. The
history sheds light on important and dynamic relationships between political
and legal argument and political and legal legitimacy. It also helps to illumi-

194. S.REP. No. 110-209, at 10-11 (2007).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 10.
197. FISA Amendments Hearing, supra note 180, at 8 (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein,
Assistant Att'y Gen. for National Security, United States Department of Justice).
198. Id. at 48 (statement of Patrick F. Philbin, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis, L.L.P.).
199. SCHWARZ & HuQ, supra note 50, at 155-56 (quoting Nixon's exchange with television
interviewer David Frost).
200. FISA Amendments Hearing, supra note 180, at 15 (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein,
Assistant Att'y Gen. for National Security, United States Department of Justice) (remarking that
since the President and Congress were moving "toward a point where we are all on the same page
...there is not going to be any need for the executive branch to go beyond what FISA has
required").
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nate the under examined role of constitutional theory in the oft-told story of
the imperial presidency.
Normative engagement with exclusivity is called for as well. As we
have seen, among exclusivist arguments are those that draw from evolving
history. These arguments start from the premise that there is a long history
of congressional acquiescence and presidential initiative with respect to national security.
This history, exclusivists argue, reflects the correct
constitutional order, one in which Congress oversteps when its legislation
conflicts with presidential judgments concerning national security and in
which presidents may circumvent such legislation.
The first and most important response to this line of exclusivist
argument is simply to deconstruct it. That is, to ask why a history of
congressional acquiescence and presidential initiative necessarily supports
exclusivity. As we have seen, exclusivists sometimes take this point as a
given. Second, once we probe more deeply into the history, we may findas is certainly true in the case of wiretapping-that relative congressional
inaction does not reflect anything close to an exclusivist consensus on
Congress's part and that even the Executive Branch has not consistently
taken an exclusivist stance. Of course, this historical insight does not answer
the question of whether, why, and to what extent post-founding political
branch history should matter in the realm of separated powers. Still, it is an
important corrective to the historical narrative often assumed among
exclusivists. At minimum, it calls into question the veracity of the notionfor whatever the notion might be worth if true-that critics of programs like
the TSP "want to overturn American historical practice in favor of a new and
untested theory about the wartime powers of the President and Congress. '2' °'
Finally, even where evolving historical arguments reflect some
historical truths-such as the fact that administrations from FDR onward
wiretapped despite the view of many that wiretapping was illegal under the
1934 Telecommunications Act2 02-exclusivity does not follow automatically
from the same. To the contrary, historical developments may prove to be so
deeply at odds with constitutional principles as to counsel that the historical
course be righted, not that the nation throw its hands up in defeat. As we
have seen, decades of wiretapping abuses at the highest levels of American
government offer just such counsel. What history has yet to reveal is
whether we will heed its lessons.

201. YOo, supra note 7, at 124.
202. See supra subpart Ill(A).

